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Abstract
Numerous experimental efforts have shown that antineutrino-based monitoring pro-
vides a non-intrusive means to estimate the fissile content and relative thermal power of
nuclear reactors for nonproliferation. However, close proximity to the reactor core is re-
quired in order to collect relatively high-statistics data needed for such applications. This
has limited the focus of most studies to the so-called ‘near-field’, up to about 200 meters
from the reactor core. Until now, there have been no experimental demonstrations dedi-
cated to exploring the nonproliferation potential of large detectors required for long-range
monitoring. In this low-statistics regime detailed measurements of the fissile fuel content
are not practical, but remote monitoring and discovery of reactors may be achievable. The
goal of the Advanced Instrumentation Testbed (AIT) program is to test novel methods for
the discovery of reactor cores, specifically in the mid-field to far-field, beyond 200 meters
and out to tens or hundreds of kilometers, using kiloton-scale to megaton-scale detectors.
The main physical infrastructure of the AIT consists of an underground laboratory in
the Boulby mine in Northern England. The site is located at a 26-km standoff from the
Hartlepool Reactor Complex, which houses two 1.5-GWth advanced gas-cooled reactors.
The first detector to be deployed at the AIT is the WATer CHerenkov Monitor of ANtineu-
trinos (WATCHMAN). WATCHMAN will use ∼6,000 tons of gadolinium doped water in
order to detect a few reactor antineutrinos per week from the Hartlepool reactor complex.
WATCHMAN will focus on understanding the signal efficiency, radiological backgrounds,
and the reactor operational status. Here, the nonproliferation goals are to understand
the sensitivity for discovery of one reactor in the presence of another, the discovery of
any reactor operations above a well-understood background, and the sensitivity to con-
firm the declared operational cycles of both reactors. Uniquely, AIT-WATCHMAN also
offers a flexible platform at which nascent technologies such as water-based scintillator
and fast photomultiplier tubes can be tested in real-world conditions. We present the
AIT-WATCHMAN program and status.
Presented at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) 60th Annual Meeting,
July 14-18, 2019, Palm Desert, California USA.
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1 Introduction
For non-proliferation purposes, it is important to note that even a relatively small reactor of
∼10-MWth power could produce a few kg of 239Pu per year. There are currently a few hundred
active nuclear power reactors and a few dozens under construction [1]. For example, in 2017,
about 3/4 of the electricity in France was generated by nuclear power plants, and about 1/5 —
in the US. The main question is: how to ensure that the nuclear reactors are operated solely
for peaceful uses?
On average, a nuclear reactor emits six antineutrinos per fission, each one resulting from a
beta decay of a fission daughter. The result is ∼ 2× 1020 electron antineutrinos per gigawatt of
thermal power. Antineutrino detection for reactor monitoring purposes was first proposed and
realized at the Rovno neutrino laboratory [2, 3], including the first measurement of nuclear-
fuel burnup using antineutrinos. Fuel burnup might be a key indicator for tracking a diversion
scenario for the production of weapons-grade plutonium under circumstances when direct access
to the nuclear-reactor facility is a challenge. Figure 1 shows the predicted and measured fuel
evolution at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) using antineutrino emissions.
Depending on the location, whether there are many reactors (like in North America, Europe,
and East Asia) or only a couple (Latin America and Africa), shown in Fig. 2, the backgrounds
caused by other reactors vary tremendously and would affect long-range reactor monitoring.
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Figure 1: Fuel evolution at SONGS predicted and measured based on antineutrino flux, [4].
There are many potential diversion scenarios at nuclear reactors, identified by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [5], for which reactor antineutrino monitoring might be
applicable. Good energy resolution for utilizing neutrino oscillations and neutrino directional-
ity are also keys for determining the fuel composition and the geolocation of a reactor [6, 7].
However, to draw conclusions about the status of a reactor based on the antineutrino energy
spectrum requires an accurate knowledge of the source term. There have only been a couple
of experiments, performed at the Institut Laue-Langevin [8–11], that directly measured the
beta spectrum of fission products of 235U, 239Pu, and 241Pu (fissile with slow neutrons) and only
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recently the beta spectrum originating from 238U was measured (fissile with fast neutrons). The
conversion from beta spectrum to antineutrino spectrum is complex, as there are thousands of
beta branches, leading to uncertainties in neutrino fluxes [12–14] and making the task of precise
reactor monitoring more challenging.
Figure 2: Nuclear reactor neutrino fluxes in Northern and Southern hemisphere. Note the
oscillation pattern. Figure is taken from [15].
There are three reactions by which antineutrinos from nuclear reactors can be detected,
presented in Table 1: inverse beta decay (IBD), elastic neutrino-electron scattering (ES), and
coherent elastic neutrino-nucleus scattering (CNNS). The IBD reaction, a work-horse detection
reaction in the majority of reactor experiments, provides a relatively low background delayed-
coincidence trigger — the signal associated with the positron provides a prompt signal, and the
neutron capture a delayed signal. Other advantages are that the neutrino energy is correlated
with the positron energy, while the neutron-capture location can potentially reveal directional
information of the antineutrino flux. A disadvantage of IBD is a relatively high threshold (1.8
MeV), for which only about 1/4 of antineutrinos emitted from a nuclear reactor achieve. Both
ES and CNNS have the advantage that they provide access to the whole reactor antineutrino
spectrum, and additionally the ES signal is directional. However, the practical use of ES is
limited due to the small cross section and lack of coincidence signal. For these reasons, there are
few reactor experiments that have used ES, mostly to evaluate the cross section [16]. Although
the CNNS cross section is higher than the IBD, it is difficult to detect the nuclear recoil signal.
There are currently few ongoing efforts to utilize CNNS for reactor antineutrino detection
(CNNS has been only recently experimentally observed using a spallation neutron source [17]).
Passing through matter mostly unobscured, antineutrinos are an ideal means to monitor nu-
clear reactor, even from a large distances, since their antineutrino emissions cannot be shielded.
Moreover, the antineutrino rate and spectrum slightly varies depending on the fuel composi-
tion. Recently, there have been a number of studies considering different reactor monitoring
scenarios and reactor types, such as: future thorium reactors [24]; heavy-water reactors [25];
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Type Reaction Threshold Total cross section (cm2) Scaling Ref.
IBD ν¯ep
W−→ e+n 1.8 MeV ∼ 9.53× 10−44Eepe(1 + δ) E2 [18–20]
ES ν¯ee
− W,Z−−→ ν¯ee− 0 ∼ 0.78× 10−44meEν E [16, 21]
CNNS ν¯eA
Z−→ ν¯eA 0 ∼ 0.42× 10−44N2E2ν N2, E2 [17, 22]
Table 1: Three interactions for reactor antineutrinos. Eν and Ee (∼ Eν − 1.29 MeV) are
the antineutrino and positron total energies respectively. N is the number of neutrons in the
nucleus A.
Fuel
isotope
Energy release
per fission
(MeV)
PWR
(start)
PWR
(end)
LEU HEU PHWR MOX GCR
235U 201.9 0.65 0.45 0.56 > .9 0.52 0.39 0.72
238U 205.0 0.07 0.07 0.08 – 0.05 0.08 0.04
239Pu 210.9 0.25 0.35 0.30 – 0.42 0.42 0.21
241Pu 213.4 0.03 0.07 0.06 – 0.01 0.11 0.02
IBD rate per 1 GWth in 1 ton H2O @50m per day 355 387 335 335 363
Table 2: Four main isotopes, the four horsemen, along with their energy release per fission and
average fission fractions in different reactor fuels [23]. Note that these fuel fractions change
within the cycle.
CANDU reactor monitoring [26]; experimental light-water LEU reactors [27]; and the mixed-
oxide fuel-burnup effect [28]. The four main reactor-fuel isotopes are presented in Table 2; the
other fissile isotopes, e.g. 240Pu and 242Pu, account for less than 0.1%, [29].
Reactor neutrino detectors range greatly in design and target mass, based primarily on the
distance between the reactor and the detector. The following (somewhat arbitrary) terminology
is applied, to differentiate between different baselines/ranges: near-field (∼10–200 m), mid-field
(∼200–1,000 m), and far-field (∼10,000 m). The near-field implies having access as close to the
reactor as practicable; and therefore, there must be a cooperative agreement between the reactor
management and the detector operator. The mid-field corresponds approximately to a detector
deployment just “outside the fence”. As the number of events detected decreases inversely
proportional to the square of the distance, and the neutrino cross sections are minuscule (see
Table 1), most detectors are near-field; with a few mid-field experiments — PaloVerde, CHOOZ,
DoubleCHOOZ, DayaBay, and RENO [30–34]; KamLAND [35] has been the only experiment,
which successfully detected reactor antineutrinos from an effective 180-km standoff (averaging
from more than 50 reactors in Japan and a few South Korean reactors contributing ∼3% at
∼400-km standoff). Reactor antineutrino experiments played a crucial role in understanding
nature of neutrino and the mechanism of neutrino oscillations [36, 37].
2 Advanced Instrumentation Testbed
The primary goal of the Advanced Instrumentation Testbed (AIT) is to demonstrate a reliable
long-range reactor monitoring via antineutrinos and to develop new technologies. AIT program
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ranges from nuclear non-proliferation studies to scientific — neutrino oscillations, supernova
neutrinos, and geoneutrinos. WATCHMAN will be the first detector constructed under the
AIT, and will be located at the Boulby Underground Laboratory, 26-km away from the nearest
nuclear reactor, the Hartlepool Nuclear Power Plant on the North-East coast of England, shown
in Figure 3 along with the mine geological profile. The main purpose of WATCHMAN is to
demonstrate nuclear reactor monitoring of a single reactor in the far-field using a novel detection
technology capable of being scaled to megaton-scale volumes.
 
 
 	
Hartlepool
ff WATCHMAN
Figure 3: Left: WATCHMAN location relative to British and European reactors. Orange dots
— advanced gas-cooled reactors (most of the UK); blue — LEU+MOX; green — LEU pressur-
ized water reactors (most of Europe). Hartlepool is the closest reactor complex to WATCHMAN
on the North-East Coast of England. The reactor locations are taken from geoneutrinos.org, a
web-application tool for geo and reactor antineutrinos [23]. Right: Approximate rock profile at
the Boulby cite (credit: STFC Boulby Underground Laboratory).
WATCHMAN will be located 1.1 km underground. The detector will be a 19-m-diameter
20-m-height cylindrical stainless steel tank filled with ∼6 kt of ultrapure water mixed with
gadolinium sulfate, Gd2(SO4)3, with Gd concentration of 0.1% by weight, i.e. ∼6 tonnes of
gadolinium. It will comprise an inner detector and a muon veto. The inner detector will be
instrumented with about 3,600 PMTs (∼20% photocoverage) and the veto 400. The inner
detector fiducial volume (used for the physics analysis) will be a ∼1 kt right cylinder. The
boundary of the fiducial volume will be located at least 1.5 m from the inner PMTs to protect
it from PMT related radioactive background. Figure 4 shows the current placement of main
components in the WATCHMAN detector.
The Boulby mine is the deepest operational mine in the UK, and is an active salt and potash
mine. An extensive network of tunnels (total length over 1,000 km) has been created since op-
erations started in the late 1960s. Salt, in general, is much more radio pure compared to most
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other types of rock, which further reduces backgrounds, associated with natural radioactivity
of the surrounding rock. Most importantly, since the 1990s, the Boulby mine has been hosting
the Boulby Underground Laboratory, an internationally-recognized underground scientific lab-
oratory, and has a variety of modern lab space, including clean rooms. The cosmogenic muon
flux is reduced by a factor of a million compared to the level at the surface [38]. The research,
performed at the Boulby underground laboratory, spans multiple disciplines, focusing on muon
tomography, astrobiology, dark matter, and geology; the AIT program will be adding neutrino
physics and non-proliferation research to the list.
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Figure 4: CAD diagram — vertical slice through the center of the WATCHMAN detector,
showing its main components. “PMTs” include ∼3,600 inner-facing and ∼400 outer-facing
tubes, with a liner in between — separating inner and outer (veto) regions. The PMTs are
placed about 2 meters from the walls of the stainless steel tank.
The closest reactor is Hartlepool [39] (2 GCR cores, ∼3 GWth max), located at 26 km from
Boulby. The next closest reactor is Heysham (4 GCR cores, ∼6 GWth max) — at 149.4 km
from Boulby (contributing ∼ 5% of the antineutrino flux, relative to the Hartlepool complex);
the rest of the world’s reactors account for ∼10% of the total flux, which makes Boulby and
ideal location to study long-range reactor monitoring from a single reactor complex, since the
most of the flux comes from the nearest reactor, Hartlepool.
The conversion factor for Hartlepool: per each 1 GWth of the reactor power there is ∼ 1 IBD
interaction per day in 1 kt of water at Boulby location; Figure 6 represents IBD rate as a function
of antineutrino energy. In WATCHMAN, an IBD positron produces about 7 photoelectrons per
MeV via Cherenkov emission (for scintillator detectors including water-based liquid scintillator,
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fiducial
volume
Gd mixing and water purification plant
WATCHMAN cavern
Figure 5: WATCHMAN underground layout.
this figure is a couple of orders of magnitude higher); thus, making it almost impossible to
detect antineutrinos below ∼3–4 MeV. This is the main factor contributing to WATCHMAN
detection efficiency, reducing the aforementioned rate to about 40%. The prompt event travels
a few centimeters and emits Cherenkov radiation before the positron-electron annihilation (in
scintillator, the annihilation 511-keV gammas are visible). The full detection reaction is shown
below:
|→ e+ + e− → γ(511 keV) + γ(511 keV)
ν¯e +
1H→ e+(prompt : Cherenkov) + n(delayed capture: Cherenkov by Compton-recoiled e−)
|→ n+ 155Gd→ 156Gd + γ′s (Q = 8.5 MeV)
|→ n+ 157Gd→ 158Gd + γ′s (Q = 7.9 MeV)
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Figure 6: Left: effect of the neutrino oscillations on the Hartlepool flux at Boulby (assuming 3
GWth for this calculation), along with the cumulative survival fraction of antineutrinos. Right:
IBD interaction rate at the Boulby underground location, assuming maximum power output
for both reactor cores at the Hartlepool complex. The data is taken from geoneutrinos.org [23].
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Gadolinium has the highest thermal-neutron-capture cross section of any stable element.
An effective cross section is ∼4.9×104 barns for thermal-neutron capture on Gd, mainly con-
tributing by two isotopes: 6.09×104 barns for 155Gd (14.80% nat. ab.) and 2.54×105 barns for
157Gd (15.65% nat. ab.). The 0.1% Gd-doping by weight corresponds to about 9 neutron cap-
tures on Gd per every capture on H. In addition to its high neutron-capture cross section, the
Gd(n,γ) reaction results in a few gammas summing to ∼8 MeV, which provides sufficient light
output to be detectable in a Cherenkov detector (compared to 2.2 MeV, in the case of neutron
capture on hydrogen). A detailed study of the gamma spectra along with gamma multiplicity
in the 155,157Gd(n,γ) reactions has recently been carried out [40, 41]. Adding gadolinium also
reduces the capture time needed for delayed coincidence: for the gadolinium concentration in
WATCHMAN, the mean thermalization and neutron-capture time is of the order of few tens
of microseconds (instead of few hundreds of microseconds, in case of hydrogen). The prompt
and delayed events are also correlated by distance — typically within ∼10 cm.
Gadolinium has been successfully used in liquid-scintillator detectors, and also recently in
water detectors (WAND, EGADS). Table 3 represents global research efforts. Large-volume
water-Cherenkov detectors have a great record of reliability and discovery potential since the
pioneering IMB and Kamiokande experiments [42, 43]; which makes water-Cherenkov tech-
nology well-established and cost-effective for scalability purposes. In 2001, it was proposed
to add gadolinium in water to monitor IBD events from fission nuclear explosions at long
range[44]. Adding gadolinium makes the detector sensitive to both IBD signals — the prompt
positron and delayed neutron (via capture on Gd). In 2003, J. Beacom and M. Vagins [45]
separately proposed to add gadolinium to a large-volume water-Cherenkov detector (namely,
SuperKamiokande or SuperK) to detect diffuse supernova neutrino background (DSNB, or
relic supernovae antineutrinos). In the early 2000s’, as the Bernstein paper notes, the cost
of gadolinium was $100 per gram. Since then the cost plummeted by a few orders of mag-
nitude and gadolinium has become an affordable commodity. Although a SuperK scale (50
ktons) is needed to sufficiently register DSNB, for reactor monitoring purposes a detector can
be made smaller and placed at an appropriate distance from a reactor. EGADS has successfully
demonstrated the technology of doping water with gadolinium on a 200-ton scale.
Similar to EGADS and SuperK-Gd designs, the water system of WATCHMAN will have
a water-purification system and Gd-mixing system, schematically shown in Figure 5. The
technological challenge that has been successfully demonstrated originally for EGADS is to
selectively retain gadolinium Gd while removing all other impurities — a so-called molecular
band-pass filtration, a new method developed by M. Vagins, based on a staged nanofiltration [46].
Since the gadolinium itself is not water-soluble, it is added in the form of gadolinium sulfate,
which is water-solubale. The toxicity of gadolinium sulfate is relatively low and a method of
tracing gadolinium in the environment has been developed [47].
The construction of WATCHMAN is scheduled to begin in 2020. After two years of op-
eration, WATCHMAN will be refilled with a water-based liquid scintillator (WbLS), a new
technology developed by M. Yeh’s group at Brookhaven National Laboratory [48], which al-
lows for the detection of an additional small level of scintillation light with a slightly reduced
Cherenkov signal. While more R&D is needed to accurately determine the light propagation
properties of WbLS, the aim is to achieve higher detection efficiency and better energy and
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Project Mass Gd content Ref.
Dazeley et al. 0.25 ton 0.2% wt. GdCl3 [49]
Watanabe et al. 2.4 liters 0.2% wt. GdCl3 [50]
WAND 1.0 ton 0.4% wt. GdCl3 [51]
WATCHBOY 2 tons 0.2% wt. GdCl3 [52]
ANNIE 26 tons 0.2% wt. Gd2(SO4)3 [53]
EGADS 200 tons 0.2% wt. Gd2(SO4)3 [46]
WATCHMAN 6 kt (1 kt fiducial) 0.2% wt. Gd2(SO4)3 [54]
SuperK-Gd 50 kt (22.5 kt fiducial) 0.2% wt. Gd2(SO4)3 [45]
Table 3: Global research efforts on Gd-H2O technology.
vertex reconstruction. The Advanced Instrumentation Testbed will be a platform for testing
future technologies relevant to remote reactor antineutrino monitoring and exploring scalability
to large-volume and cost-effective reactor antineutrino monitors.
3 Summary
Building on proven technology, WATCHMAN will be the first large-scale Gd-doped water-
Cherenkov detector with a primary goal of far-field monitoring of a single nuclear reactor
complex. On a scientific side, WATCHMAN will be added to a network of supernova neutrino
monitors, and has potential to provide additional information for reactor neutrino oscillations
at far-field.
In recent years, an extensive simulations and data-analysis software tool set has been de-
veloped. PMT tests and DAQ instrumentation downselect processes have already started. The
main components of the proposed water purification and gadolinium mixing have been iden-
tified. The cavern excavation is scheduled to begin in 2020. Over the course of 2 years of
operation, we expect to detect ∼1,000 IBD events originating from the two nuclear reactor
Hartlepool site. After the necessary tests and the establishment of a way to continuously purify
WbLS, a proposal to upgrade the detector to a water-based liquid scintillator will be consid-
ered. The introduction of WbLS will likely increase light yield, and therefore decrease the
energy detection threshold, resulting in potential sensitivity to geoneutrinos.
The AIT-WATCHMAN collaboration has been growing rapidly and now includes almost
a hundred members from a few dozen institutions, most of whom have experience in building
large-scale neutrino detectors.
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